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HAS TIME RUN OUT FOR THE NCAA? AN
ANALYSIS OF THE NCAA AS A PLACE OF
PUBLIC ACCOMMODATION
INTRODUCTION

Over the past half century the United States has taken
tremendous strides in ensuring the equality of all citizens.
Although our nation still has a long way to go until we live in a
society that "neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens,"
significant progress has been made.'
Just this past year, Major League Baseball, the "national
pastime," celebrated the fiftieth anniversary of Jackie Robinson's
emergence as the first black baseball player in the league.2 In
honor of Robinson's legacy and contributions to both society and
baseball, every Major League Baseball team retired the number 42,
Robinson's number during his playing days with the Brooklyn
Dodgers.3
Much of the racial progress made in professional sports can be
traced to the amount of publicity focused on accommodating racial
minorities in professional athletics.4 While professional sports
have slowly opened their doors to minorities, college athletics
broke the color barrier decades before the professional ranks.'
1. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896)(Harlan, J., dissenting).
2. Jackie's No. 42 Retired Forever, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, April 16, 1997,
atDOL.
3. Id. There are countless authorities that deal with our nation's storied
history of discrimination towards blacks as well as other minorities. The United
States' history of discrimination in sports alone is quite detailed. Probably the
most famous and well-documented story of discrimination is that of Jackie
Robinson. To read a thorough account of the trials and tribulations of this man,
see ALFRED DUCKETT & JACKIE ROBINSON, I NEVER HAD IT MADE (1972);
JULES TYGIEL, BASEBALL'S GREAT EXPERIMENT (1983).
4. Timothy Davis, Book Review, Who's In and Who's Out: Racial
Discriminationin Sports, 28 PAC. L.J. 341 (Winter 1997)(reviewing KENNETH
L. SHROPSHIRE, IN BLACK AND WHITE: RACE AND SPORTS IN AMERICA

(1996)).

5. Michael Oriard, College Athletics as a Vehicle for Social Reform, 22 J.C.
& U.L. 77, 81-82 (Summer 1995). See also DUCKETT & ROBINSON, supra note
3, at 23. Robinson became the first four-letter star at UCLA. Despite this
accomplishment, Robinson still believed he had no future after he exhausted his
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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Collegiate athletics, from race to gender has played an instrumental
role in breaking down the barriers and stereotypes of minorities
and their ability to compete athletically. In the past two decades,
the National Collegiate Athletic Association ("NCAA") has largely
focused on the accommodation of women in order to achieve
compliance with Title IX 6
Passed under the Education
Amendments of 1972, 7 Title IX states that, "[n]o person in the
United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from
participation in, be denied benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any education program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance."'
Although Title IX does not
specifically address equality in athletics, a number of court
decisions have interpreted the provisions of this Act to require
compliance with Title IX in the athletic arena.9 Many believe that
the birth of two successful women's professional basketball
leagues in the past year is attributable to the success of women's
college basketball, a beneficiary of Title IX. 0
While blacks and women have made strides in college athletics,
individuals with disabilities have been left behind." This has a
great deal to do with the relatively short life of the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA").12 This legislation has been
responsible for an increased awareness of the struggles and
difficulties for disabled individuals in this country and has created
much needed remedies for individuals with disabilities. 3
eligibility: "I could see no future in staying at college, no real future in
athletics, and I wanted to do the next best thing - become an athletic director."
id.
6. Rikki Ades, Play Ball: Title IX, University ComplianceandEqual Pay, 13
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTs. 347 (Winter 1997).
7. 20 U.S.C. § 1681-88 (1994).
8. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a).
9. Ades, supra note 6, at 349.
10. Joe Gilmartin, 'Next' Big Thing May Already Be Here, ARIZONA
REPUBLIC, May 25, 1997, at C2; John Schumacher, Leagues of Their Own,
Women Build on Olympic Hoopla, SACRAMENTO BEE, December 22, 1996, at
Cl.
11. W.S. Miller, Ganden v. NCAA: How the NCAA 's Efforts to Clean Up Its
Image Have Created an Ethical and Legal Dilemma, 7 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 465,
471 (Spring 1997).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 12101-12181 (1994).
13. Laura F. Rothstein, Higher Education and Disabilities: Trends and
Developments, 27 STETSON L. REv. 119, 119-120 (Summer 1997).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol8/iss1/5
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One group of individuals with disabilities, those who are
learning disabled, have had a particular problem participating in
college athletics due to restrictive NCAA rules.14 Learning
disabilities are protected under the ADA, s but because learning
disabilities are often misunderstood, even among post-secondary
educators, there is much debate concerning the accommodation of
students with this disability. 6 Universities and colleges have
become a battle ground for this debate.17 In the past few years, the
NCAA, with some prodding from the U.S. Department of Justice,
has taken numerous steps to accommodate learning disabled
individuals.1 While the NCAA has begun to show initiative, it has
nevertheless been served with a number of lawsuits by student
athletes who could not meet the academic eligibility requirements
for participation in the NCAA.19
In light of the numerous challenges to the NCAA's policy, this
comment will address whether the NCAA can be challenged under
Title Il of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. If the
NCAA is deemed a private entity operating a place of public
accommodation, its actions could be challenged under Title EI of
the ADA. While this has not yet occurred, there is a movement in
the courts to have this status imposed on the NCAA so it can be
challenged under this legislation."
Part I of this comment will discuss the history and the guidelines
of three important anti-discrimination statutes passed in the last
half century. Part II will set forth the basic foundation of what
constitutes a learning disability. Part III will describe the NCAA
as an organization and discuss how the courts have construed the
14. Mark Asher, LearningDisabled Get Boost: Justice Dept. Suggests NCAA
Alter Policies,WASH. POST, March 1, 1996, at B05.
15. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1)(2)(1993).
16. See generally SUSAN A. VOGEL & PAMELA B. ADELMAN, SUCCESS FOR
COLLEGE STUDENTS WITH LEARNING DISABILITIES (1993).
17. See Guckenberger v. Boston University, No. CIV.A. 96-11426-PBS,
1997 WL 523931 (D. Mass. Aug. 15, 1997).
18. Asher, supra note 14, at B05.
19. See Ganden v. NCAA, No. 96C6953, 1996 WL 680000 (N.D. Il1. Nov.
21, 1996); Bowers v. NCAA, No. CIV.A. 97-2600, 1997 WL 471817 (D.N.J.
Aug. 14, 1997). See also Shelly Anderson, Edinboro Freshman Frustratedby
NCAA Rules on LearningDisabled, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, November 17,
1996, at D12.
20. Id.
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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status of the NCAA in prior decisions. This section will also look
at a number of the recent cases that have been decided between
student-athletes and the NCAA. Part IV will address what has
been found and what has not been found to be a public
accommodation. Finally, Part V will analyze how the courts are
likely to rule and how the courts should consider ruling on whether
the NCAA is a private entity operating a place of public
accommodation under Title 1I1 of the ADA.
I. ANTI-DISCRIMINATION STATUTES

Since the groundbreaking Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress
has enacted thirteen pieces of legislation designed to help the
disabled.2" While each of these acts has benefited individuals with
disabilities in different manners, the three most influential pieces
of legislation have been the Civil Rights Act of 1964,22 the
Rehabilitation Act of 197323 and the Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990.24

A. The Civil Rights Act of 1964
Judges from all ends of the judicial spectrum realize that the
greatest sting of discrimination in our country has been felt by

21. Miller, supra note 11, at 466. The legislation passed since the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 include: (1) Architectual Barriers Act of 1968; (2) The
Rehabilitation Act of 1973; (3) Education for All Handicapped Children Act of
1975; (4) Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act of 1975;
(5) The Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act of 1980; (6) The Orphan
Act of 1983; (7) Protection and Advocacy for Mentally Ill Individuals Act of
1986; (8) Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 1986; (9) The Voting
Accessibility for the Elderly and Handicapped Act; (10) The Air Carriers
Access Act; (11) The Fair Housing Amendments Act; (12) The Americans With
Disabilities Act of 1990; and (13) The Civil Rights Act of 1991. Id.
22. 42 U.S.C. § 12101-12213.
23. 29 U.S.C. § 701-796.
24. 42 U.S.C. § 12101-12213.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol8/iss1/5
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blacks." Unfortunately, throughout history this mistreatment was
fostered by our nation's legal system.26
In 1954, the Supreme Court took its most resounding step
toward abolishing discrimination and the concept of "separate but
equal" in the case of Brown v. Board of Education.7 Brown
appeared overdue after a series of Supreme Court decisions that
signaled the demise of the "separate but equal" doctrine.28 The
implementation of this ruling, however, was not eagerly accepted
by either the judicial, the legislative or the executive branches of
government.29 In fact, it took another decade for the next major
breakthrough in the Civil Rights movement." This time, however,
the judiciary was not the initiator of the progress. Instead, it was
President Lyndon B. Johnson, an unlikely hero from the deep
south, who expanded upon the groundwork laid by both the
Supreme Court and President John F. Kennedy."
President Johnson was unequivocally determined to enact this
legislation, garnering enough political support to sign the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 into law.32 Despite the momentum gained by
Johnson from the outpouring of sentiment for the slain President
Kennedy, the bill's enactment was still an onerous task.33
In addition to the expected opposition from those who had
supported the suppression of minorities, this bill was further
complicated by Representative Howard "Judge" Smith, the

25. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 527 (1989)(Scalia,

J., concurring) ("It is plainly true that in our society blacks have suffered racial
discrimination immeasurably greater than any directed at other racial groups.").
26. See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 539.
27. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
28. See McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950) (holding
unconstitutional the requirement that a black student sit in special seat in the
classroom, cafeteria, and library). See also Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629
(1950) (ordering the admission of a black student to a white law school).
29. See Brown, 349 U.S. at 294. This case has been labeled the "all
deliberate speed" case. This second ruling has been widely criticized because it
allowed schools to take the appropriate time needed to desegregate, as opposed
to accelerating the desegregation process. See id.
30. 42 U.S.C. § 2000.
31. VAUGHN DAVIS BORNET, THE PRESIDENCY OF LBJ 96-101 (1983).
32. Id.
33. Id.
Published
by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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chairman of the House Rules Committee.3 4 Smith attempted to
sabotage this bill by suggesting that Title VII of the Civil Rights
Bill be amended to include "sex" among the long list of
impermissible reasons for discriminating in the employment
context.35 Smith's hope was to amend this bill to such an extreme
that the changes would be too dramatic for Congress to accept,
thereby defeating the legislation.36 The stiffest opposition came
from northern liberals who were afraid that adding "sex" to the bill
would lead to the demise of the Act.37 Smith's plan, however, did
not succeed and the Smith Amendment adding sex to the Civil
Rights Act passed 168-133. 38 The Act was signed by President
Johnson on July 2, 1964.39
After the struggle in adding "sex" to the Civil Rights
Amendment, it was not surprising that Congress was not ready to
adopt legislation to prevent discrimination against individuals with
disabilities.4" Nearly another decade would pass before any federal
legislation would be enacted to protect the millions of disabled
Americans.41
B. The RehabilitationAct of 1973
The most significant push for federal legislation to prevent
discrimination against individuals with disabilities began in the
early 1970s.42 The first attempt to pass this type of legislation was
with the Rehabilitation Act of 1972.43 Congress perceived
discrimination against individuals with disabilities to be "most

34. Robert E. Rains, A Pre-History of the Americans with DisabilitiesAct
and Some Initial Thoughts as to its ConstitutionalImplications, 11 ST. LouIs U.
PuB. L. REv. 185, 187 (1992).
35. Id. at 187.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. 42 U.S.C. § 2000.
40. Rains, supra note 34, at 187.
41. 29 U.S.C. § 701-796.
42. Rains, supra note 34, at 188.
43. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 295 n. 14 (1985).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol8/iss1/5
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often the product, not of invidious animus, but rather of
thoughtlessness and indifference-of benign neglect."
Members of Congress harshly expressed their disappointment
concerning the lack of legislation for disabled Americans. One
representative deemed this mistreatment as one of our nation's
"shameful oversights." ' Senator Hubert Humphrey emphasized
similar sentiments toward this injustice when he offered legislation
to protect the handicapped in 1972, proclaiming that "we can no
longer tolerate the invisibility of the handicapped in America." '
Despite the adamant proclamations of Congress and the lack of
debate in both houses over this act, there still was opposition to the
Rehabilitation Act's passage.47 President Nixon vetoed the bill
twice4 ' before finally signing the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 into
law on September 26, 1973. 4"
The stated purpose of the Rehabilitation Act was "to empower
individuals with disabilities to maximize employment, economic
self-sufficiency, independence, and inclusion and integration into
society...."" Additionally, the Act emphasized the need for the
Federal Government to play a leadership role in promoting these
equal opportunities for the disabled, thereby ensuring the disabled
the chance to earn meaningful and gainful employment as well as
independent living."s
For an individual with a' disability to claim a violation of the
Rehabilitation Act, a four prong test must be satisfied. 2 The
claimant needs to demonstrate: (1) a disability as defined by the
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

HENRY H. PERRITT, JR.,
HANDBOOK, § 6.2. (2d ed. 1991).

AMERICANS

WITH

DISABILITIES

ACT

49. The heart of this legislation is 29 U.S.C. § 794(a): "No otherwise
qualified individual with a disability in the United States, as defined in section
706(8) of this title, shall, solely by reason of her or his disability be excluded
from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to

discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance or under any program or activity conducted by any Executive
agency...."
50. Id. at § 701.
51. Id.
52. Southeastern
Community Coll. v.2016
Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
Published
by Digital Commons@DePaul,
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Rehabilitation Act, (2) that the claimant is "otherwise qualified" to
meet "all of a program's requirements in spite of [his/her]
handicap," (3) the individual was discriminated against "solely by
reason" of the disability, and (4) the party being sued receives
federal financial assistance (or is the beneficiary
of a government
53
program, including government contracts).
While the Rehabilitation Act was not a comprehensive piece of
legislation establishing remedies for the disabled, its impact was
still quite significant.14 The passage of this Act was an important
symbolic victory because the disabled were finally recognized as a
group that had suffered from years of discrimination.55 Most
importantly, it laid the foundation for the revolution of the 1990's,
when disabled Americans could point to proactive legislation that
offered more than just a moral victory.
C. The Americans With DisabilitiesAct of199056
1. The Applicability of the ADA
When President Bush signed the Americans with Disabilities Act
of 1990 into law, it became the single most important piece of
legislation for individuals with disabilities.17 Most importantly, the
ADA extended to elements of the private sector, thereby filling the
holes of the Rehabilitation Act.5 ' Because the ADA adopted the
enforcement provisions of the Civil Rights Act, while still being

53. See generally id.
54. Rains, supra note 34, at 190-192 ("The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 only
prohibits discrimination by federal executive agencies, federal grantees and
federal contractors.").
55. Miller, supra note 11, at 467.
56. 42 U.S.C. § 12101-12213.
57. Senate Approves Bill ProtectingDisabled,BATON ROUGE STATE TIMES,
September 8, 1989, at 8D. Senator Edward M. Kennedy called the ADA "an
Emancipation Proclamation for the disabled, and America will be a better, fairer
and stronger nation because of it." Id. Senator Tom Harkin called the ADA "a
landmark statement of basic human rights that will make the promise of equal
opportunity a reality for 43 million Americans with disabilities." Id.
58. Rains, supra note 34, at 198.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol8/iss1/5
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interpreted "consistently with the Rehabilitation Act," 9 it provided
the same comprehensive protection from discrimination that had
been previously provided to other groups that had been victims of
discrimination.'
To state a claim of discrimination under Title II or Title IIof the
ADA, an individual must prove: (1) that he or she has a
"disability" within the meaning of the ADA; (2) that the defendant
is subject to the requirements of the Act; (3) that the plaintiff was
denied the opportunity to participate or benefit from the services
and accommodations of the defendant on the basis of the plaintiff's
disability; and (4) reasonable accommodations could have been
made which would not have fundamentally altered the nature of the
goods, services or accommodations.61
Titles II and I differ with respect to the second element of these
requirements.62
Title II is applicable when the defendant
committing the violation is a public entity, and the remedy is
injunctive relief and attorney's fees.63 A public entity is broadly
defined.' Title HI is pertinent when the defendant is a private
entity and it affects commerce while operating a place of public
accommodation.65 Congress created a comprehensive list of over
59.

Vande Zande v. Wisconsin Dep't of Admin., 851 F. Supp 353, 359

(W.D. Wis. 1994), af'd,44 F.3d 538, 542 (7th Cir. 1995).
60. Welsh v. Boy Scouts of Amer., 993 F.2d 1267, 1270 (7th Cir. 1993).
See also 42 U.S.C. § 2000.
61.

Thomas v. Davidson Academy, 846 F. Supp. 611, 617 (M.D. Tenn.

1994).
62. Johnson v. Florida High Sch. Athletic Assoc., 899 F. Supp. 579, 582
(M.D. Fla. 1995).
63. 42 U.S.C. § 12132. The code reads: "Subject to the provisions of this

subchapter, no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such
disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the
services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to
discrimination by any such entity." Id.
64. 42 U.S.C. § 12131. The code reads as follows: "Definitions as used in
this subchapter:
(1) Public entity: The term "public entity" means(A) any State or local government;
(B) any department, agency, special purpose district, or other
instrumentality of a State or States or local government; and
(C) the National Railroad Passenger Corporation, and any commuter
authority (as defined in section 502(8) of Title 45).
65. 42byU.S.C.
12181.
Published
Digital§ Commons@DePaul,
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fifty specific facilities that are subject to regulation as a public
accommodation.66 The NCAA has been found to be a private
entity. 6
Accordingly, the only possible remedy for a case of
discrimination under the ADA against the NCAA is through Title
11[.68

2. The Policy ConsiderationsBehind the ADA
Congress found that "some 43,000,000 Americans have one or
more physical or mental disabilities, and this number is increasing
as the population as a whole is growing older."'69
These
astronomical numbers made it clear to Congress that it was
imperative to pass legislation for individuals who had historically
been subjected to isolation and segregation because of their
disabilities.'0 Congress stated:
"Individuals with disabilities are a discrete and
insular minority who have been faced with
restriction and limitations, subjected to a history of
purposeful unequal treatment, and relegated to a
position of political powerlessness in our society,
based on characteristics that are beyond the control
of such individuals and resulting from stereotypic
assumptions not truly indicative of the individual

66. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). The section reads as follows: "The following
private entities are considered public accommodations for purposes of this
subchapter, if the operation of such entities affect commerce(C) a motion picture house, theater, concert hall, stadium, or other place of
exhibition or entertainment;
(D) an auditorium, convention center, lecture hall, or other place of public
gathering;
(L) a gymnasium, health spa, bowling alley, golf course, or other place of
exercise or recreation."
These are the sections of Title III where it has been argued the NCAA could
be listed. Butler v. NCAA, No. 96 CV 1656D, slip op. at 4 (W.D. Wash. Nov.

8, 1996).
67. NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 (1988).

68. Id. See infra part IV
69. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1).
70.
42 U.S.C. § 12101.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol8/iss1/5
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ability of such individuals to participate in, and
contribute to society."'

This finding is especially intriguing because the phrase "discrete
and insular" is the language used by Justice Harlan F. Stone in his
72
famous footnote four of United States v. Carolene Products.
Since then, the phrase "discrete and insular" has been used as a
threshold to describe a class of persons in constitutional
adjudication for the levels of scrutiny that the Supreme Court
should use in reviewing equal protection cases.7 3 A class of
persons found to be discrete and insular by the Supreme Court will
be entitled to a higher level of scrutiny.74 The most discrete and
insular minorities in our nation's history, earning strict scrutiny
review, are the groups classified by race, alienage or national
75
origin.
Individuals with disabilities, on the other hand, are not entitled to
strict scrutiny review according to City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Center.76 In fact, individuals with disabilities are not even
entitled to the intermediate review standard used by the Court for
quasi-suspect classes.77 The Supreme Court found that the
mentally disabled were neither discrete nor insular, thereby not
deserving of more exacting judicial review.78 This is because the
Federal Government has not allowed discrimination against the
mentally disabled in federally funded programs, and the
government has "provided the retarded with the right to receive
'appropriate treatment, services, and habilitation' in a setting that is
'least restrictive of [their] personal liberty."7 9 This legislative
response convinced the Court that individuals with disabilities

71. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7).
72. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
73. See generally Croson, 488 U.S. at 495; Regents of Univ. of California v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 289 (1978); Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 17-18
(1977).
74. Croson, 488 U.S. at 495.
75. Id.

76. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
77. Id. at 443.
78 Id.
Published
by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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have the support of the public and, therefore, cannot be deemed
politically powerless.8"
Since this decision is still good law, the language of Congress in
the ADA is especially fascinating. By calling individuals with
disabilities a "discrete and insular" minority in the ADA, Congress
may have been emphasizing that the disabled should either be a
quasi-suspect class deserving of intermediate review or a suspect
class entitled to strict scrutiny.81 Such a statement by Congress
would be unprecedented if it had intended to create, by statute, a
quasi-suspect or suspect classification. However, this issue has yet
to be attacked head-on and is likely to be an issue that will
eventually be resolved in the courts.8 2
As long as Cleburne is good law, individuals with disabilities
will continue to be entitled to only rational basis review for equal
protection cases." Regardless of how the disabled are classified
under equal protection review, the ADA is still an authoritative and
vitally important piece of legislation that has and will continue to
provide numerous remedies for Americans with disabilities.
I. LEARNING DISABILITIES

A. What is a learningdisability?
The question "What is a learning disability?" has yet to be
definitively answered because the field is still relatively new. 4
The 1980s saw the most significant increase in the awareness of
learning disabilities, shattering a number of misconceptions about
The term "learning disability"
persons with these disabilities.8
was first proposed as a compromise over the various definitions
and descriptions given to children with average to above average

Id. at 445.
Rains, supranote 34, at 201.
Id. at 202.
Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 321 (1993).
84. DANIEL P. HALLAHAN & JAMES M. KAUFFMAN, EXCEPTIONAL LEARNERS
162 (7th ed. 1997).
85. VOGEL & ADELMAN, supra note 16, at 3.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol8/iss1/5
80.
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intelligence but who had substantial problems in learning.86 The
first formal definition of "learning disabilities" was drafted by the
National Advisory Committee on Handicapped Children (1968)
and was incorporated into the Education for All Handicapped
Children Act of 1975.7
Over a decade later, the National Joint Committee for Learning
Disabilities ("NJCLD") revised this definition to increase the
awareness that this disability does not apply only to children, and
often does not disappear once these individuals reach adulthood.88
This definition was created to eliminate the phrase "basic
psychological processes," which had been an integral part of the
definition incorporated into the Education for All Handicapped
Children Act of 1975. It was imperative to eliminate this phrase
from the definition because these processes are not observable and,
therefore, quite difficult to measure. Furthermore the prior
definition of learning disabilities did not mention "perceptual
handicaps, dyslexia, or minimal brain dysfunction" which are
equally hard to define.9" The most important distinction, however,
is that the NJCLD emphasizes that a learning disability may be a
lifelong condition.91
86. HALLAHAN & KAUFFMAN, supra note 84, at 162. Other terms used to
describe these children were "minimally brain injured, .... a slow learner,"
"dyslexic," or "perceptually disabled." Id.
87. Id. The Federal Register, 1977, § 121a.5 states:
"Specific learning disability" means a disorder in one or more of the basic
psychological processes involved in understanding or in using language,
spoken or written, which may manifest itself in an imperfect ability to listen,
think, speak, read, write, spell, or to do mathematical calculations. The term
includes such conditions as perceptual handicaps, brain injury, minimal brain
dysfunction, dyslexia, and developmental aphasia. The term does not include
children who have learning problems which are primarily the result of visual,
hearing, or motor handicaps, of mental retardation, of emotional disturbance, or
of environmental, cultural, or economic disadvantage."(emphasis added)
88. VOGEL & ADELMAN, supra note 16, at 4.
89. Id.
90. HALLAHAN & KAUFFMAN, supranote 84, at 168.
91. Id. NJCLD, 1989, pg. 1, states:
"Learning disabilities is a generic term that refers to a heterogeneous group of
disorders manifested by significant disabilities in the acquisition and use of
listening, speaking, reading, writing, reasoning, or mathematical abilities. These
disorders are intrinsic to the individual, presumed to be due to central nervous
dysfunction,
and Commons@DePaul,
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The increased awareness of learning disabilities is directly
responsible for the substantial rise in the number of students
identified with a learning disability.92
Since the federal
government first began to collect figures in 1976 and 1977, this
number has doubled.93 With this increase has come substantial
debate over whether students are over-identified or too quickly
labeled as learning disabled. 94 This controversy was recently
addressed by the Federal District Court of Massachusetts in the
case of Guckenberger v. Boston University."
B. The Controversy Over Accommodation
Although a learning disability is accepted as a legitimate
disability there is a significant dispute as to who is qualified to
make the assessment that an individual has such a disability. 96 In
Guckenberger, Boston University ("BU") was sued by ten
university students with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder
("ADHD"), attention deficit disorder ("ADD") or other learning
disabilities, alleging that the new policies created by President Jon
Westling violated the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act.97
Westling had purportedly formed these new policies to tighten
BU's procedures for granting academic accommodations to
students with learning disabilities, fearing that BU was
compromising its academic standards to help students with

behaviors, social perception and social interaction may exist with learning
disabilities but do not by themselves constitute a learning disability. Although
learning disabilities may occur concomitantly with other handicapping
conditions (for example, sensory impairment, mental retardation, serious
emotional disturbance) or with extrinsic influences (such as cultural differences,
insufficient or inappropriate instruction), they are not the result of those
conditions or influences."
92. Id. at 169.
93. Id. at 168. The federal government now estimates that slightly more than
five percent of public school students between the ages of six and seventeen
have a learning disability. Id.
94. Id.
95. See supra note 17.

96. Rothstein, supra note 13, at 121.
97. Guckenberger,1997 WL 523931, at*l.
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learning disabilities.98 Westling claimed he was guided by his
belief that while learning disabilities may exist, many of the
students diagnosed as learning disabled are "victims of overblown
and unscientific claims by some learning disability advocates." "
This case gained national significance as a result of Westling's
public statements. 1" Westling's most inflammatory act was to
1
give speeches about a student he dubbed "Somnolent Samantha."''
Samantha, however, turned out to be a fictional character,
infuriating learning disability advocates. 102 This character was
described as a student who often slept in class, but because she had
a "learning disability" the lecturer not only had to tolerate the
sleeping in class, but had to fill the student in on the material she
missed." 3 U.S. District Judge Patti Saris took exception to
Westling's creation of Samantha for the purpose of denouncing the
zealous advocates of learning disabilities," as well as his
"proclivity for making controversial comments about learning
disabilities."' ' The common sentiment is that the court took a
harsher stance against BU because of Westling's behavior. 6
The ruling in Guckenbergerwas both beneficial and detrimental
to BU and the learning disabilities movement. 107 The University
benefited from the court's finding that federal disability law does
not require universities or colleges to compromise their admissions
criteria in order to accommodate learning disabled students.10
Specifically, the court found that Boston University did not have to
accept a learning disability diagnosis from an evaluator who was
98. Jon Westling, One University Defeats DisabilityExtremists, WALL ST. J.,
September 3, 1997, at A21.
99. Id.
100. NBC Nightly News (NBC television broadcast, May 9, 1997).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Joseph P. Shapiro, The Strange Case of Somnolent Samantha, Do the
LearningDisabled Get Too Much Help?, U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORT, April

14, 1997, at31.
104. Guckenberger, 1997 WL 523931, at *6.
105. Judge's Scathing Decision May Have Limited Legal Impact, But
Provides Guidance, Relief for Disability Service Offices, DISABILITY
COMPLIANCE FOR HIGHER EDUCATION, September 1997, Vol. 3,

106. Id.
107. Id.
108. by
Westling,
supranote 98, at A21.2016
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not qualified or reputable.1" 9 The court also found that BU
presented acceptable evidence to show that students with ADD and
ADHD need to be reevaluated because the symptoms of these
disorders can change in different environments, can be treated with
medication and can remit from adolescence to adulthood. 110
While BU won some battles, the ten plaintiffs' victory was also
quite significant."' Judge Saris found that BU's rule requiring the
diagnosis of a student's learning disability to be no more than three
112
years old, in violation of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act.
The court ruled against BU, saying this requirement was so
burdensome that it screened out students with learning
disabilities. 3 The ruling that most benefited the plaintiffs was
that BU was ordered to cease and desist its policy of requiring
learning disabled students who had been diagnosed by
professionals with masters degrees and or sufficient experience to
be re-diagnosed solely by professionals who have "medical
degrees, or licensed clinical psychologists in order to be eligible
for reasonable accommodations. 114
Despite its advances, the Guckenberger decision is not being
hailed as precedential 15 Nevertheless, the decision was a victory
for the learning disabled community. 6 A number of individuals
who work with students with learning disabilities feel that this case
may facilitate the extinction of the prejudices and skepticism
towards learning disabilities. 17
109. Guckenberger, 1997 WL 523931, at *28. The court found that it was
not unreasonable or significantly burdensome to require a student who was
requesting an accommodation, and had not yet been diagnosed with a learning
disability to be tested by someone with a doctorate degree as opposed to a
masters degree. Id.
110. Id. at *30.
111. DISABILITY COMPLIANCE, supra note 105, at 7.
112. Guckenberger, 1997 WL 523941, at *26.
113. Id.
114. Id. at *48.
115. DISABILITY COMPLIANCE, supra note 105, at 1.
116. Id.at7.
117. Id. Judge Saris stated that these prejudices are not acceptable: "I find
that BU's initial denial of any effective accommodation in October was based in
part on an impermissible, discriminatory stereotype that many learning disabled
students are lazy and can meet the degree requirements if they try hard enough
without accommodation." 1997 WL 523931, at *47.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol8/iss1/5
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I.THE NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC
ASSOCIATION
A. Who is the NCAA?
The NCAA is a voluntary, unincorporated association consisting
of approximately 1200 public and private colleges and
universities.'
The NCAA is the primary regulator of
intercollegiate athletics in the United States and the sponsor of
eighty-one national championships for a number of sports,1 19
ranging from the multi-million dollar men's basketball tournament
to considerably smaller tournaments, such as swimming, lacrosse
and tennis championships.'
The NCAA constitution proclaims that the basic fundamental
policy for the Association is "to maintain intercollegiate athletics
as an integral part of the educational program and the athlete as an
integral part of the student body and, by so doing, retain a clear
line of demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and
professional sports." '
Upon entrance into the NCAA, each
member school accepts the responsibility to control their institution
and preserve the title "student-athlete" in compliance with this
fundamental policy and enforce the rules and regulations of the
Association.'22 If an institution disobeys the NCAA regulations,
the member school is subject to the enforcement procedures of the

118. Bowers, 1997 WL 471817, at *1.
119. NCAA Manual 1997-98, Operating Bylaws, Rule 18.3. Of the eightyone national championships, there are 10 National Collegiate Championships,
24 Division I championships, 23 Division II championships and 24 Division In
championships.
120. See Melissa Issacson, Pray There's No Pay-For-Play, CHI. TRIB.,
February 23, 1997, § 4, at 1. In 1997, the NCAA signed a contract with CBS
for $1.7 billion to televise the Men's Division I Basketball Tournament until
2002. Although there is no tournament for Division I Men's Football, the
NCAA pays out $8.5 million per team for the eight schools selected to the
College Football Bowl Alliance. Id.
121. NCAA CONST. art. I, § 1.3.1.
122. NCAA CONST. art. III, § 3.2.4.1.
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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NCAA Committee on Infractions.'23 The penalties that the
Infractions Committee can impose include forfeiture of contests,
monetary fines, probation,124loss of scholarships and ineligibility for
post-season tournaments.
B. What is the NCAA?
The NCAA is a private organization. 121 Many of the member
schools, however, are public universities which receive federal
funds. Prior to 1984, however, in the eyes of the law, the NCAA
was a state actor. 126 In Howard University v. NCAA,"27 the court
found the NCAA to be acting under the color of state law because
of the large number of member schools that were funded by either
state or federal governments. 28 The court also found that since the
NCAA regulated and supervised the intercollegiate athletics of
publicly funded schools, the NCAA and "its public
instrumentalities are joined in a mutually beneficial relationship,
and in fact may be fairly said to form the type of symbiotic
relationship between public and private entities which triggers
constitutional scrutiny.' ' 129
The court realized that the
governmental involvement was not "exclusive," but still found that
the NCAA's actions were significantly "impregnated with a
governmental character."'"3 The ruling in Howard was followed in
a number of other cases, and for the next decade the NCAA was
treated as a governmental body.13
In 1984, the Fourth Circuit in Arlosoroff v. NCAA took the first
step toward restoring the NCAA to private entity status.132 The
Fourth Circuit's ruling was a result of two Supreme Court
123. NCAA Bylaws, 19.1 (1997-1998).
124. NCAA Bylaws, 19.6 (1997-1998).
125. Tarkanian,488 U.S. at 179.
126. Travis L. Miller, Home Court Advantage: Florida Joins States
MandatingDue Processin NCAA Proceedings,20 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 871, 879
(Spring 1993).
127. 510 F.2d 213 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
128. Id. at 214.
129. Id. at 220.
130. Id.
131. See Tarkanian,488 U.S. at 182 n.5.
132. 746 F.2d 1019 (4th Cir. 1984).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol8/iss1/5
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decisions.'33 These Supreme Court cases rejected the notion that
the indirect involvement of state governments could convert
private action into state action."' Under the guidance of these
rulings, the Fourth Circuit found that regulation of intercollegiate
athletics is not a function that was "traditionally exclusively
reserved to the state."' 35 Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit found that
the NCAA's acceptance of membership funds from public
institutions did not reconstruct the basic character of the NCAA.'36
After the ruling in Arlosoroff,the road was paved for the Supreme
13 7
Court's landmark decision for the NCAA.
C. NCAA v. Tarkanian..8
In Tarkanian, the plaintiff was the head coach of the men's
basketball team at the University of Nevada Las Vegas
("UNLV"). 139 Tarkanian took over as head coach of a mediocre
UNLV team in 1973 and, within only a few years, he turned the
program into a national powerhouse. 4 In September of 1977, just
months after a season in which Tarkanian led the Running Rebels
to a 29-3 record and an appearance in the Final Four, UNLV
informed Tarkanian that he was going to be suspended because the
NCAA Infractions Committee found that the basketball team had
committed thirty-eight violations of NCAA rules.'41 Ten of these
violations were directly linked to Tarkanian.142
The NCAA placed UNLV on two years probation and requested
that the school show cause why the Association should not compel
133. See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982); Blum v. Yaretsky,

457 U.S. 991 (1982).
134. Id.
135. Arlosoroff,746 F.2d at 1021.
136. Id. at 1022 ("It is not enough that an institution is highly regulated and
subsidized by a state. If the state in its regulatory or subsidizing function does
not order or cause the action complained of, and the function is not one
traditionally reserved to the state, there is no state action.").
137. Miller, supranote 126, at 879.

138. 488 U.S. 179 (1988).
139. Id.
140. Id. at 180.
141. Id. at 180-81.
142. Id. at 181. Commons@DePaul, 2016
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further sanctions against the school if Tarkanian was not suspended
143
from his coaching duties during the probationary period.
Tarkanian brought suit in Nevada state court alleging a violation of
his due process rights under 42 U.S.C.§ 1983.44 In order for
Tarkanian to obtain relief, he had to establish his suspension as a
"state action" prohibited under the Fourteenth Amendment. 4 The
Supreme Court concluded that "the source of the legislation
adopted by the NCAA is not Nevada, but a collective membership,
speaking through an organization that is independent of any
particular state.' 1 46
Since UNLV had decided to suspend
Tarkanian under the color of the NCAA, as opposed to the color of
state law, the Court held that the NCAA was not a state actor and
could not
be held liable for a violation of Tarkanian's civil
1 47
rights.
Almost a decade later this case continues to be the law of the
land. The NCAA is not considered a governmental body.148 A
new debate, however, has arisen regarding what type of
classification the NCAA deserves. This new controversy focuses
on whether the NCAA is a private entity operating a place of
public accommodation under Title III of the ADA. 149 Title III of
the ADA allows a private entity operating a public accommodation
to be sued under this Act if it discriminatorily denies access to an
individual with a disability. 5

143. Tarkanian,488 U.S. at 181.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 182.
146. Id. at 193.
147. Id.
148. Miller, supra note 125, at 881.
149. See Ganden, 1996 WL 680000, at *11.
150. 42 U.S.C. § 12181.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol8/iss1/5
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IV. PLACES OF PUBLIC ACCOMMODATION

A. Cases That Indicate the NCAA May Be A Place of Public
Accommodation
Just recently a number of cases have begun to raise questions
over how the NCAA should be categorized. Two of these cases,
Ganden v. NCAA"' and Butler v. NCAA,' 52 have had success in
establishing the NCAA as a place of public accommodation within
the meaning of the ADA.
Ganden was a well-publicized and highly charged case. The
plaintiff, a seventeen year old learning disabled swimmer from
Naperville North High School,"5 3 had excelled on the swim team,
and was the Illinois defending champion in the 100 yard free-style
two years in a row. 5" While Ganden flourished at athletics,
thereby earning him athletic scholarship offers from numerous
schools, he struggled with academics."5 ' Ganden suffers from a
decoding learning disability that primarily affects his reading and
writing skills. 6 Naperville North accommodated this disability by
offering Ganden assistance through a number of counselors and
teachers.'57 This team of helpers designed a specific curriculum,
the individual Education Program ("EP"), for Ganden, that
addressed his particular disability and academic weaknesses. 5
Naperville North also offered Ganden five special courses that
were intended to help address his weaknesses; two of these courses
became the crux of the NCAA's problem with Ganden.5l 9

150. No. 96 C 6953, 1996 WL 680000 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 21, 1996).
152. No. 96 CV 1656D (W.D. Wash. Nov. 8, 1996).
153. Michael Neill & Joni H. Blackman, Kicking Back: A

Learning

DisabledSwimmer Battles the NCAA, PEOPLE MAGAZINE, April 15, 1996, at 89.

154. Mark Asher, Judge Denies Ganden an Injunction; Learning-Disabled
Swimmer Unlikely to Compete in Freshman Year, WASH. POST, November 20,
1996, at C08.
155. Neill & Blackman, supra note 153, at 89.
156. Ganden, 1996 WL 680000, at *1.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. by
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Under NCAA guidelines, an incoming freshman athlete must
maintain a certain grade point average that varies based on the
strength of student's standardized test score. The student must also
have completed 13 "core courses" in order to be eligible to
compete during the freshman year.160 A core course is defined by
NCAA bylaws as a recognized academic course that offers
fundamental instructional components in a specified area of
Special education courses can be accepted as core
study."'
courses. 62 The NCAA found that two of the courses offered to
Ganden did not meet the requirements of a "core" course according
to NCAA standards. 63 In as much as Ganden did not satisfy the
NCAA's core courses requirement, he was ruled ineligible to
compete during his freshman year at Michigan State."
In Butler v. NCAA, the plaintiff, Toure Butler, was a standout
defensive back for Cascade High School in Snohomish County,
Voted All-Western AAA Conference South
Washington. 6
Division in both his junior and senior seasons, Butler earned a
scholarship from the University of Washington.166 Much like
Ganden, Butler has a learning disability and was declared
ineligible to compete for the University during his freshman year
because one of his high school classes did not satisfy the core
course requirement for incoming freshmen.167
Ganden and Butler both sought preliminary injunctions against
the NCAA under Title IIof the ADA, claiming that the NCAA
160. Bowers, 1997 WL 471817, at *1.
161. NCAA Bylaws 14.3.1.3.
162. NCAA Bylaws 14.3.1.3.4 ("The Academics/Eligibility/Compliance
Cabinet may approve the use of high-school courses for students with
disabilities to fulfill the core-curriculum requirements if the high-school
principal submits a written statement to the NCAA indicating that students in
such classes are expected to acquire the same knowledge, both quantitatively
and qualitatively, as students in other core courses. Students with disabilities
still must complete the required core courses and achieve the minimum required
grade-point average in this core curriculum.").
163. Ganden, 1996 WL 680000, at *4.
164. Id.
165. Victor Yoshida, UW Football Coaches on Notice: Put Butler In, He's
Ready To Play, SEATTLE TIMES, February 6, 1996, at C5.
166. Id.
167. Federal Ruling Benefits Husky Defensive Back, SEATLE POSTINTELLIGENCER,
October 31, 1997, at E2.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol8/iss1/5
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168
was not allowing them to compete because of their disabilities.
Butler was granted a preliminary injunction and allowed to
compete because U.S. District Court Judge Carolyn Dimmick
focused on the irreparable harm that would have been done to
Butler if he was not allowed to compete. 69 Unlike Ganden, who
received "partial qualifier status" (meaning he retained his
scholarship and was able to participate in every aspect of the swim
team except the competitions), Butler would most likely have lost
his scholarship and would have had to quit school if not for the
70

injunction.1

Although Judge Blanche Manning of the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois did not grant Ganden a preliminary
injunction which would enable him to compete in NCAA
sanctioned events, the court found that "Ganden ha[d] a reasonable
likelihood of demonstrating that the NCAA constitutes a 'place of
public accommodation' within the meaning of Title HI.''171 The
Western District of Washington, on the other hand, did not
explicitly rule that the NCAA was a place of public
accommodation. Rather, the court denied the NCAA's motion to
dismiss by finding that the question was one of mixed fact and law
and allowed Butler to develop his argument and present the issue
before the court at a later date.172
B. How the Ganden Court Foundthe NCAA To Be A Public
Accommodation
1. Is the NCAA Closely Connected to the Facilitiesof Its Member
Schools?
In Ganden, the plaintiff presented a twofold argument as to why
the NCAA should be considered a public accommodation within
the scope of Title EEi 7 The first argument was that the NCAA
168. Butler v. NCAA, No. 96 CV 1656D (W.D. Wash. Nov. 8, 1996).
169. Rothstein, supra note 13, at 131.
170. Id.
171. Ganden, 1996 WL 680000, at *10.
172. Butler, No. 96 CV 1656D, slip op. at 9.
WL 680000, at *8.
Ganden,
173. by
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itself, as a membership organization, was a place of public
accommodation because it was "closely connected" to the
particular facilities of the member institutions that held the
swimming meets.174 The second argument stated that the NCAA
operates the facilities of its member schools, thereby making the
NCAA a place of public accommodation.
In its consideration of the NCAA as a private entity closely
connected to a particular facility, the court looked to the findings
of other jurisdictions. 75 In order to show that a close connection
exists between a membership organization and a facility the court
determined: (1) the organization must be affiliated with a particular
facility; and (2) membership in or certification by that organization
or location that is
must act as a "ticket" to admission at the facility
1 76
affiliated with the membership organization.
According to Ganden's attorneys, the athletic facilities used by
member institutions were primarily constructed for NCAA
competition and, because the NCAA was created to govern these
competitions and relied on the use of these facilities, the
organization was "inextricably tied" to these facilities.1 77 The court
agreed and felt that Ganden had a reasonable probability of
showing that the NCAA was both a membership organization with
a close connection to a particular facility and that NCAA
certification serves as a "ticket" to use the MSU facilities. 178 The
court reached this conclusion by distinguishing the Seventh
of America, even though
Circuit's ruling in Welsh v. Boy Scouts
179
case.
this
control
to
appears
Welsh
In Welsh, the plaintiff sued the Boy Scouts of America under
Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, claiming he was denied
admittance to this membership group for refusing to affirm his
belief in a supreme being.' The plaintiff claimed the Boy Scouts

174. Id.
175. See U.S. Jaycees v. Massachusetts Comm. Against Discrimination, 463
N.E.2d 1151, 1159 (1984).

176. Ganden, 1996 WL 680000, at *10.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. 993 F.2d 1267 (7th Cir. 1993).
180. Id. at 1268. The Boy Scout Oath states: "On my honor I will do my
to do my duty to God and my country and to obey the Scout law, to help
best
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol8/iss1/5
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are a private entity operating a public accommodation."' Although
Welsh was a civil rights action, the Seventh Circuit found Title I
of the Civil Rights Act to be similar to Title HI of the1 2ADA and
analyzed these two Acts in conjunction with each other.
The court used the same two prong test later used in Ganden to
establish that the Boy Scouts are not closely tied to any physical
facility." 3 This was because the Boy Scouts hold the majority of
its meetings at the private residences of the Scout members." 4 The
Seventh Circuit emphasized that "[a]lthough the Boy Scouts
organization does own and/or rent buildings used mainly for
administrative purposes, this alone falls far short of transforming
the Boy Scouts of America into a public accommodation." ' The
court also found that the Boy Scouts did not satisfy the second
element of this test finding the Boy Scouts are not a "ticket" to a
particular facility. 186 The ticket to the Boy Scouts only functioned
for purposes of participation in the inter-group activities of the
membership organization, such as meeting and outings, the ticket
did not prevent access to the Boy Scout facilities."8 7
The court in Ganden felt that the NCAA was distinguishable
from the Boy Scouts, since NCAA events occur in stadiums and
arenas that were open to the public.'
The NCAA was closely
affiliated to these public facilities by reason of the member
institutions constructing these facilities to be used for training and
holding intercollegiate competition, unlike the Boy Scouts who did
not build its private residences solely to hold Scout meetings." 9
Furthermore, the court reasoned NCAA certification was in fact a
"ticket" to use the Michigan State facilities because Ganden could
not compete in a NCAA sanctioned competition at these facilities
without the NCAA's certification.' 90
other people at all times, to keep myself physically strong, mentally awake and

morally straight." Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 1270.
183. Id. at 1273.
184. Welsh, 993 F.2d at 1274.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 1271.
187. Id.
188. Ganden, 1996 WL 680000, at 10.
189. Id.
190. Id.
Published
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This Ganden ruling appears to be misguided for a number of
reasons. First, the NCAA should be analogous to the Boy Scouts
because it does not either own, operate or lease any of these
buildings, much like the Boy Scouts do not own the private
residences where the meetings are held.19 1 The NCAA functions
apart from any facility where competitions are held, especially in
the Ganden case, since Michigan State University is the sole owner
of the swimming facility where the NCAA meets are held.192
Secondly, Michigan State University's facilities were not solely
used for competitions sponsored by the NCAA.'93 MSU's
ownership of the physical structure allowed the school to use these
facilities for unsanctioned competitions and for recreational use
that had no relation to NCAA activities. 94 The NCAA did not
deny Ganden access to the physical MSU facility; it merely denied
him the ability to compete within the membership organization. 9
The Sdventh Circuit has ruled that the "ticket" to a place of public
accommodation is only applicable in regards to access for a
physical location or facility, not for access to participate in a
group's activities irrespective of the facility.196 Therefore, by
virtue of Title III not including activities as a place of public
accommodation, as long as the NCAA only prohibited Ganden
from participating in a sanctioned activity, not access to a physical
facility, NCAA certification does not function as a "ticket" to
access.

197

Although the NCAA does not satisfy the aforementioned twoprong test for finding membership organizations to be a place of
public accommodation under Title HI, there also is a question as to
whether this test should exist. When the Seventh Circuit used this
test, it acknowledged that several federal courts had applied this
test to find a membership organization was closely connected to a
particular facility and therefore it was compelled to use the test as
well.1 98 The court, however, expressed reservations about using a
191. Id. at *8.
192. Id.
193. Ganden, 1996 WL 680000, at *8.

194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Welsh, 993 F.2d at 1271.

197. Id. at 1269.
198. Id at 1272.
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judicially created exception to find membership organizations as a
place of public accommodation. 99
The Seventh Circuit disagreed with the plaintiffs argument that
if Title Il of the ADA expanded the number of establishments that
were listed as public accommodations in Title II of the Civil Rights
Act, and thus, the ADA should be read by the courts as including
membership organizations. 2" Noting there was no proof that
Congress ever intended to include membership organizations or
activities under Title II, the court explained:
This argument fails to recognize that had
Congress intended to include membership
organizations lacking a close connection to a
specific facility, it would have incorporated such a
mandate in the disabilities act.... In the recently
enacted Disabilities Act, Congress listed over fifty
specific facilities subject to regulation, but did not
include membership organizations lacking a close
connection to a physical facility.2"'
The court pointed out that, on two separate occasions, Congress
had an opportunity to include membership organizations into this
law, but chose otherwise. 2 The Seventh Circuit felt this made
Congress' intent clear and thus refused to read language into the
statute language that was obviously not in there." 3 The court
determined that Congress did not intend for voluntary membership
organizations such as the NCAA to be places of public
accommodation under Title II of the ADA.2"

199. Id. at 1271 ("Certainly, federal judges must not reach out and grasp at
straw in an attempt to rewrite the laws duly enacted by the legislative branch of
government, the Congress.").
200. Id.
201. Welsh, 993 F.2d at 1271.
202. Id. at 1270. The court also informed the plaintiffs that if they "wish to
change the law, the proper forum is the Congress of the United States where all
interested parties will be entitled to engage in the full panoply of hearings and
arguments before the congressional and senatorial committees." Id. at 1271.
203. Id.
204. by
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Elitt v. U.S.A. Hockey supports the view that membership
organizations are not a place of public accommodation under Title
1]1.205 In Elitt, the plaintiff, a child with ADD, brought action
under Title III of the ADA to compel the Creve Coeur Hockey
Club to allow him to participate.2 °6 The defendant, U.S.A. Hockey,
was an umbrella organization that sponsored U.S. Amateur hockey
clubs such as Creve Coeur.20 7
The Eastern District of Missouri took a literal interpretation of
Title Il, similar to the Seventh Circuit in Welsh, finding that
U.S.A. Hockey was not covered by the ADA because membership
organizations "are not sufficiently similar to any of the listed
private entities in § 12181(7). " 208 Although the court felt that
membership
organizations
are not places of public
accommodation, it was still compelled to use the same two part test
used in Welsh and Ganden for "instructive analysis. ' 2°
Consequently, the court determined U.S.A. Hockey was: (1) not
affiliated with the facility that was open to the public; (2)
membership in U.S.A. Hockey was not a "ticket" to use the
facilities; and (3) the plaintiff was not denied access to the facility-he was only denied the opportunity to participate in the intergroup activities.21
2. Does the NCAA Operatethe FacilitiesofMember Schools?
Ganden's claimed that the NCAA was a place of public
accommodation because the NCAA "operates" the athletic
facilities where intercollegiate competitions are held. 2 The court
agreed with Ganden, saying that there was a reasonable probability
that he could prove that the NCAA demonstrated more control
over the facilities of a member institution than just determining
whether a student could participate in sanctioned competitions.1
205. 922 F. Supp. 217 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
206. Id.at 218.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 223.
209. Id.
210. Elitt,922 F. Supp. at 223.
211. Ganden, 1996 WL 680000, at *10.
212. Id.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol8/iss1/5
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In reaching this conclusion the court disagreed with the case of
Johannesen v. NCAA." 3 In this case, the plaintiff, an Arizona State
University football recruit, sought to enjoin the NCAA from
declaring him ineligible because he did not satisfy the core courses
requirement.214 The plaintiff claimed he was discriminated on the
basis of his learning disability and brought suit under Title III of
the ADA.215 The Johannesen court relied on Sandison v. Michigan
High School Athletic Association to rule that the NCAA was not
operating a place of public accommodation and even if the NCAA
was operating ASU's facilities it could not be sued under Title
111[.216

In Sandison, the court found that the Michigan High School
Athletic Association was a public entity.217 Since the MHSAA was
not a private entity it could not be sued under Title Ill of the
ADA.218 The Sixth Circuit held that:
§ 12181(7) ... make[s] clear that public
accommodations are operated by private entities,
not public entities. The plaintiffs complain that the,
MHSAA age eligibility rule precludes them from
equally participating in track events held on public
school grounds or, presumably for cross-country
events, in public parks. Public school grounds and
public parks are of course operated by public
entities, and thus cannot constitute public
2 19
accommodations under Title ]I.
Applying this finding to Ganden, even if the NCAA was closely
connected to the facilities at Michigan State and operated these
facilities, because MSU is a public school, Ganden could not seek
relief against the NCAA under Title III. The only remedy for
Ganden would be through Title II, which is not possible as long as
213. No. Civ. 96-197 PHX ROS (D. Ariz. April 30, 1996).
214. Id. at 1.
215. Id. at 2.
216. See also 64 F.3d 1026, 1036 (6th Cir. 1995).
217. Id
218. Id.
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Tarkanian continues to be the law of the land.22 Therefore, even if
Ganden could prove that the NCAA operated the facilities at MSU,
there could be no possible redress under Title HI of the ADA.
The court in Ganden, however, offered two arguments why
Johannesen should not control.2"' First, the court held that "parties
may not escape the requirements of the ADA through multiple
ownership or management of a facility. 2 22 Although MSU may
have owned and operated the swimming facilities, the NCAA
could also operate and own the facility. 223 The court also cited
Welsh and mentioned that the Seventh Circuit had found that
"precedent applied Title II of the CRA to organizations 'that
conducted meetings in public facilities or operated facilities open
to the public like swimming pools, gyms, sports fields and golf
2 24
courses.'

While Welsh did find that if a membership organization operates
facilities open to the public it could be a place of public
accommodation, the court reached this conclusion by asking the
question, "what did the person join?' 2 To answer this, the court
must determine the purpose of the organization. 2 6 In its analysis,
the Seventh Circuit distinguished the YMCA, a membership
organization that was found to be a place of public
accommodation, from the Boy Scouts. 227 The purpose of the
YMCA was to operate facilities where people "sleep, reside or
exercise"
by
owning
gymnasiums
and
overnight
accommodations.2 8 Without these facilities, the purpose of the
YMCA would be thwarted.229
When an individual would join the Boy Scouts it was for a
reason completely on the other end of the spectrum from the
reasons for joining the YMCA. An individual's goal in becoming
a Boy Scout would be to join a group of young boys and "foster
220. Tarkanian,488 U.S. at 179.
221. Ganden, 1996 WL 680000, at *11.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id. at *11 n.8; Welsh, 993 F.2d at 1272.
225. Welsh, 993 F.2d at 1275.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 1273. See also Homick v. Noyes, 708 F.2d 321 (7th Cir. 1983).
228. Welsh, 993 F.2d at 1273-74.
229. Id. at 1274.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol8/iss1/5
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respect for God, their country and their fellow man" while under
the guidance of adult leadership.23
Arguably, no one joins the
Boy Scouts solely for the purpose of using its facilities.
The NCAA is also distinguishable from the YMCA. The
purpose of the NCAA is to maintain intercollegiate athletics as an
integral part of the collegiate experience. The NCAA does this
through its focus on allowing a student athlete to get a proper
education while integrating with the student body. Furthermore,
these goals should be achieved while the NCAA maintains the
amateur status for its athletes.231 In order to carry out this function,
the NCAA must obviously offer athletic competitions. However,
even Ganden found that "merely operating the competitions
themselves" does not constitute "operating" the entire facility.232
The purpose of the NCAA is not to operate the individual facilities
at each member school, rather the NCAA operates wholly apart
from any of individual member school's particular facilities.
In Johannesen, the plaintiff claimed he was denied access to a
'
"place."233
Ruling in favor of the defendant, the court found that
Title III controlled private entities operating public
'
accommodations, not "places."234
The Seventh Circuit disagreed
with this interpretation of Title III, saying the term "place" in the
legislation was not merely a term of convenience.23 Furthermore,
the court felt it necessary to adhere to the rule of statutory
construction because a court should not construe a statute in a way
that makes "words or phrases meaningless, redundant or
'
superfluous."236
However, it seems hard to believe that the term
"place" was just a mere word to be added in the statute when
Congress found it necessary to include such an extraordinary
amount of facilities in the text.
The Seventh Circuit further took exception to the argument that
the word "place" was only in the statute was because it would have

230. Id. at 1269.
231. NCAA CONST. art. I, § 1.3.1 (1997-1998).
232. Ganden, 1996 WL 680000, at* 11.
233. No. Civ. 96-197 PHX ROS at 6-7 (D. Ariz. April 10, 1996).
234. Ganden, 1996 WL 680000, at* 11.
235. Welsh, 993 F.2d at 1267.
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been too difficult for Congress to draft the statute without this
word.237 The court stated,
We fail to understand why the dissent claims that
Congress was incapable of drafting the statute
without the word 'place' Congress could have very
easily have drafted the statute without using the
word and instead written "each of the following, if
it serves the public, is a public accommodation
within the meaning of this title...,' but Congress
made a considerate and deliberate choice not to do
238
[this].
The court asserted that the clear language of Title ITobviously
39
intended for "places" of public accommodation to be listed.
Since a membership organization is not a physical place, a
membership organization should not be deemed a place of public
accommodation.24 °
There are a number of cases, however, that support the ruling
that "place" of public accommodation applies only to physical
places.24 In Stoutenborough v. NFL, the court found that the
National Football League ("NFL"), the media networks and the
local media affiliates do not fall under the definition of places of
public accommodation under Title III of the ADA.24
The plaintiff, an individual with a hearing impairment, sued the
NFL over its blackout rule, which prohibited the televised
broadcast of a game within the home territory of team on the day a
game was hosted and the stadium was not sold out. The court
found that even though the hearing impaired individual may view
the game at a place of public accommodation and the game may be
played at a place of accommodation, the broadcast of a game is not
237. Id. at 1273.
238. Id.s
239. Id.
240. Welsh, 993 F.2d at 1273.
241. See Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752 (9th Cir. 1994)
(holding that nonprofit organization providing information to the public
concerning cults and support to former cult members was not a "place" of public
accommodation under Title II of the Civil Rights Act).
242. 59 F.3d 580 (6th Cir. 1995).
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a public service.243 The court adopted a literal interpretation of
Title III, finding that in order to be a "place" of public
accommodation, the entity must be a place, thus a television
broadcast was clearly not a "place." 2 "
V. How WILL THE COURT RULE ABOUT "PUBLIC
ACCOMMODATIONS" IN THE FUTURE?

The recent line of cases addressing this issue appear to be
leaning in the direction of finding the NCAA to be a place of
public accommodation. In addition to the decisions in Ganden and
Butler, the U.S. Department of Justice has publicly stated that the
NCAA is a place of public accommodation under Title md and was
in violation of the ADA by prohibiting Ganden from competing
during his freshman year.245 This issue, however, has yet to reach
any court of appeals. In Ganden, the Seventh Circuit never had the
opportunity to affirm or overturn Judge Manning's ruling that the
NCAA was likely to be found as a place of public accommodation,
because Ganden had his motion for an injunction denied on a
separate issue.246
The only Seventh Circuit case to deal with a similar issue was
Welsh, which was decided only four years prior to Ganden. The
Seventh Circuit ruled strongly in this case that membership
organizations were not a place of public accommodation.247 The
Seventh Circuit adopted a literal interpretation of Title Ill and
adamantly adhered to Congressional intent when it decided not to
read a "membership organization" into the exhaustive list of
private entities operating a place of public accommodation. 4
Moreover, even though the Seventh Circuit accepted that there was
243. Id. at 583.
244. Id.
245. See also Gary Reinmuth, Ganden Gets Backing From Justice Dept.,
CHI. TRIB., October 31, 1997, § 4, at 6.
246. Ganden, 1996 WL 680000, at *17.
247. Welsh, 993 F.2d at 1278 ("It is interesting to note that the challenged

Boy Scout Oath is strikingly similar to the one expressed by our Founding
Fathers on July 4, 1776 in the Declaration of Independence ....
Certainly this
Court must not upset such enduring principles by stretching beyond recognition
a statute drafted to guide equal access to public facilities.").
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an exception that allowed a membership organization to be a place
of public accommodation, the court expressed reservations about
using this two part test. 49 In light of the strong feelings that the
Seventh Circuit expressed towards preventing the Boy Scouts from
being deemed a place of public accommodation, it is more than
likely that Judge Manning's findings in Ganden would have been
overturned.
Accordingly, excluding policy consideration and looking only at
the express language of the ADA, it is hard to see how the NCAA
could be sued under Title I. The list of private entities operating
a place of public accommodation under §12181(7) is quite
exhaustive, making it hard to imagine a legitimate way of
classifying the NCAA as a place of public accommodation. This
statute lists over fifty entities ranging from zoos, to homeless
shelters, to bakeries and nursery schools.25 0 Nowhere in this
section is an entity listed that is not an actual, physical "place,"
making it difficult to accept a membership organization as a place
of public accommodation, regardless of the two part test.
Although the language of the statute is plainly in favor of the
NCAA there is still the possibility for individuals with disabilities
to obtain redress under Title III. The fact that the Supreme Court
has ruled that the NCAA is not a governmental body, thereby
prohibiting the NCAA from being sued under Title II of the ADA
may weigh against the NCAA in the future. Since the NCAA
clearly does not fall under Title II, the only avenue for individuals
with disabilities would have to be under Title III.51 It is hard to
believe that the NCAA will be able to remain untouched by the
provisions of the ADA, especially after the increased pressure that
the Justice Department has begun to put on the NCAA 2
The well-documented position of the Justice Department
combined with public sentiment for student athletes with learning
disabilities will continue to put this issue in the news. These two
factors, however, cannot overcome the reality that it will be
difficult to sue the NCAA under Title III as long as the language of
the ADA is so explicit. As §12181(7) reads today, it is difficult to
249. Id. at 1271.
250. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7).
251. Sandison, 64 F.3d at 1036.
252. Reinmuth, supra note 245, at 6.
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find an exception under which the NCAA would fit. Obviously, if
Title III of the ADA is amended to include private membership
organizations, then the NCAA could be a "place" of public
accommodation. Additionally, if the Supreme Court was to rule
that the NCAA is a place of public accommodation, the NCAA
would be open to lawsuits under Title III of the ADA.
Until that day, however, the law clearly favors the NCAA.
Justice, however, has eyes of its own and often looks beyond the
language of the law and looks to policy. It is hard not to feel for
students such as Chad Ganden, Toure Butler and the thousands of
other student athletes with learning disabilities that have overcome
their academic hardships to excel at athletics. Policy may dictate a
change in how the NCAA is defined under the law in order to help
these student athletes.
While the tide may be turning against the NCAA time has not
yet run out. As long as the language of the ADA remains
unchanged, public policy and public sentiment should not rule the
day and the NCAA should not be considered a private entity
operating a place of public accommodation under Title M of the
ADA.

Robert J. Adelman
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